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ABSTRACT
The aim of this study is to analyse the impact of board size on a firms’ operational and market performance at
the largest East Central European listed non-financial, non-public utility firms. The literature debates the effects
of the size of the board. While the resource dependency theory supports a positive effect, the agency theory
supports a negative impact on firm value. This question is rarely investigated in two-tiered corporate gover-
nance models. This paper estimates the effects of management board and supervisory board size, between 2007
and 2016. The results indicate that the effect of management board size depends heavily on the size of the
observed company. In both fixed effects and GMM-type dynamic panel regression models, using Tobin’s Q,
market-to-book ratio, total shareholder value and ROA as firm performance measures, increase in management
board size has a significant positive impact on firm performance; however, in the case of larger firms, the effect
is significantly negative. Moreover, the increase in the ratio of outside directors has a positive impact on the
firm’s performance in all dynamic panel regression models and this effect is even more significant in Tobin’s Q
and market-to-book ratio models. This can indicate the effective monitoring role of the supervisory board.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Corporate governance has become a popular research field in management sciences in the last
30 years, although a single definition for corporate governance does not exist. According to
Dobak and Steger (2003: 223), ‘corporate governance from an overall perspective is the struc-
turing of the control mechanisms, monitoring, and organisation of a company or a group of
companies in a manner that satisfies owners’ objectives.’ A well-known definition of corporate
governance comes from Shleifer and Vishny (1997), who consider it as how investors get the
managers to give them their money back.
The significance of corporate governance structure is the separation of ownership and
control in public companies was first described by Berle and Means (1932). According to them,
professional managers run the company because they have expertise, but the shareholders as the
owners of the company, bear the risks. Therefore, a corporate unit must exist that can protect
the interests of the owners. This unit is called the Board of Directors. Modern corporate
governance theory is based on the seminal study of Jensen and Meckling (1976) that forms the
foundation of the agency theory.
In practice, two fundamental corporate governance models can be distinguished, the one-
tiered and the two-tiered models. The Anglo-Saxon or Anglo American (Anglo-US) corporate
governance structure is known as one-tiered, while the German–Japanese model is called two-
tiered. In the one-tiered structure, the Board of Directors represents the interests of the owners
and this unit consists of the managers of the company (insiders) and individuals who are in-
dependent of the company (outsiders). In the two-tiered structure, there are two boards. The
first is called the Board of Directors or management board, and the other, the supervisory board.
The first board consist of insiders, while the supervisory board consists of outsiders.
The crucial question is, how the interests of the owners can be protected. This process is
called monitoring. According to Agrawal and Knoeber (2012), monitoring can be realised by
large shareholders, the Board of Directors and the market of corporate control. This latter
represents the shareholders’ rights regarding takeover of the firm. The main roles of the Board of
Directors are the monitoring of the management, rewarding or penalizing the managers and
advising on the strategic decision-making process. Agrawal and Knoeber (2012) mention that
the Board of Directors is typically measured by two characteristics, its size (number of members)
and its composition (proportion of members who are outsiders or independent of the man-
agement).
In corporate governance studies, the main question usually relates to identifying the
connection between corporate governance characteristics and a firms’ financial performance. As
Michelberger (2016: 85) writes, ‘well governed firms should have a higher firm performance and
value.’ He also (2016: 86) mentions that ‘several studies [. . .] indicate that companies with good
corporate governance have better long-term performance for shareholders or in terms of general
business performance.’
Researchers have been looking for the answers to whether there is an optimal size of
corporate boards, and how corporate governance should improve to contribute better financial
performance. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) recommended measures for improving corporate
governance, arguing that the source of failures is not incomplete legal regulations, but oversised
boards. Large boards can lead to weaker control mechanisms. Lipton and Lorsch thought that
corporate boards are responsible for the ineffective companies’ performance, and argued that the
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only way to improve firm performance is by improving the efficiency of the Board of Directors.
Board size was seen as crucial in this perspective.
Jensen (1993) disagreed with Lipton and Lorsch, and recommended that boards should not
exceed eight people, and that board members should have high equity. Nguyen et al. (2015)
references both Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Jensen (1993), in finding that the relation between
board size and firm value is not uniformly decreasing. ‘When boards are relatively small, adding
more directors can increase the firm’s value because the latter bring their expertise and re-
lationships that increases the firm’s competitiveness’ (Nguyen et al. 2015: 5).
Jensen (1993) listed four control forces which can influence managers’ behaviour to improve
firm performance and act in shareholders’ interests: capital markets or market for corporate
control; the legal, political and regulatory system; product and factor markets; and an effective
internal control system.
Although corporate governance has been studied for more than 30 years, how to improve it
is still a crucial field of research. On October 18, 2018, over twenty prominent executives,
representing some of America’s largest corporations, pension funds and investment firms, came
together to sign the Commonsense Principles 2.0. They included Warren Buffet, Jamie Dimon
(Chairman and CEO of JPMorgan Chase) and Larry Fink (Chairman and CEO of BlackRock).
One of the key principles states that ‘while no one size fits all – boards need to be large enough to
allow for a variety of perspectives, as well as to manage required board processes – they generally
should be as small as practicable so as to promote an open dialogue among directors’
(Commonsense Principles 2.0 2018: 2).
The current study aims to clarify whether the size of corporate boards affects the business and
market performance of the biggest East Central European listed companies. The database used
consists of the largest 300 listed companies in the region, with financial data for the period 2007–
2016. This region is characterised by two-tiered corporate governance systems, in which there is a
management board consisting of executive company directors, and a supervisory board
comprising independent members. The management board is responsible for operational activities
and making strategic decisions, and the supervisory board for monitoring the management board.
The relevance of this paper emerges from the lack of similar research about the relation
between corporate board size and firm performance in East Central European region, with such
a large panel database, considering both the relatively large number of companies and time
interval. The corporate governance literature has shown a huge interest in this research topic
over the past 30 years, and consequently, many papers have been published, both on developed
and developing countries.
This paper is structured as follows. After reviewing the relevant literature in Section 2, the
paper will introduce the database, the methodology set up and the hypothesis in Section 3. In
Section 4, the author will discuss the results. The paper ends with the conclusions in Section 5.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
Various corporate governance theories consider the relation between the board and the man-
agement differently. Agency theory emphasises the conflict of interest between the board and the
management (Jensen – Meckling 1976). The board represents the interests of the shareholders,
and so its most important task is monitoring the management. The role of the board is
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maximising shareholders’ wealth, reducing agency costs, selecting and rewarding the Chief
Executive Officer (CEO), evaluating CEO and company performance, making strategic decisions
and achieving management control (Zahra – Pearce 1989). On the other hand, according to the
resource dependency theory, there is no such conflict of interest between the board and the
management; the main role of the board is to provide the resources for the firm (Zahra – Pearce
1989). Resource dependency theory considers corporate boards to be a cooperative mechanism
to extract resources vital to company performance, and that boards are to serve a boundary
spanning role, enhancing organisational legitimacy (Zahra – Pearce 1989).
According to Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Jensen (1993), who represent agency theory,
large boards are not advantageous, because they are associated with weaker monitoring and slow
decision-making. Other representatives of resource dependence theory like Dalton et al. (1999),
find large boards favourable, and they emphasise the importance of the board’s advice to the
management. Agrawal and Knoeber (2012: 8) find a trade-off between more information and
more effective decision-making:
Bigger boards bring more (sources of) information but make coming to a collective decision more
difficult. Similarly, more outsider-oriented boards sacrifice information that insiders bring but may
be more unified in what to do given the available information. An optimal board is one with the size
and composition that adjusts this trade-off to maximise firm value. If boards are constituted opti-
mally, they likely will differ across firms, reflecting the relative value of better information and better
execution.
Empirical studies usually found a negative relationship between board size and firm perfor-
mance. Among US firms, Yermack (1996) found that board size has a significant negative
impact on firm performance, regardless of whether firm performance is proxied with Tobin’s Q
or ROA. He confirmed this negative impact in OLS and fixed effects econometric models. With
American data, this significant negative impact has been confirmed by other authors as well,
including Vafeas (1999) with Tobin’s Q in OLS models, Cheng et al. (2008) with Tobin’s Q and
ROA in OLS models and Coles et al. (2008) with Tobin’s Q also in OLS models.
In developed economies, most of the studies confirmed the negative relationship between
board size and firm performance, regardless of whether firm performance is measured with
Tobin’s Q or ROA. Some of the authors are Bozec (2005) with Canadian firm data, Conyon and
Peck (1998) with Danish, Dutch, French and Italian data, Bennendsen (2008) with Danish data,
Eisenberg et al. (1998) with Finnish data, Postma et al. (2001) with Dutch data, Loderer and
Peyer (2002) and Beiner et al. (2004) with Swiss data, Mak and Kusnadi (2005) and Haniffa and
Hudaib (2006) with Malaysian data, and Mak and Kusnadi (2005) with firm from Singapore.
Only Beiner et al. (2006) found a significant positive impact for board size on firm performance
using Tobin’s Q in OLS model. While Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) reported a significant positive
relationship between board size and ROA, Loderer and Peyer (2002) only confirmed the positive
relationship using ROA as firm performance.
Guest (2009) also confirmed the negative relationship between board size and firm perfor-
mance with British data using ROA, Tobin’s Q and share return. Guest used interaction terms
between board size and firm characteristics such as firm size or leverage, to separate the sample
into small and large companies. The negative coefficient of the interaction term between board
size and firm size indicates that increasing board size does not contribute to improving firm
performance at large corporations. Nguyen et al. (2015), using Australian data, also confirmed
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the negative impact of board size on firm performance, for Tobin’s Q in OLS and fixed effects
models, and ROA in OLS models.
In the East and Central European region, Gugler et al. (2014) did a similar study. They found
a significant positive relation between board size and Tobin’s Q in the sample of eleven Central
and Eastern European countries in the OLS models. Moscu (2013) found an insignificant
positive relation between board size and ROA in the OLS models among Romanian listed
companies. Ionascu et al. (2018) analysed the relationship between women on boards and
financial performance among Romanian companies and found that board size has an insig-
nificant negative impact on ROA in the OLS models, but an insignificant positive effect in the
fixed effects models. Dobija and Kravchenko (2017) found an insignificant negative relation
between board size and ROA in the OLS models.
In the East Central European region, joint stock companies usually operate in a two-tiered
corporate governance structure. For listed companies, the two-tier structure is obligatory in the
Czech and Slovak Republics, and in Poland. In Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, a one-tiered
structure is allowed. In this region, if a two-tiered structure is applied, a management board and
a supervisory board exist separately. In these six countries, the management board is called
differently (see Table 1). The management board is primary responsible for business manage-
ment, while the supervisory board monitors the management board in the interests of share-
holders. The management board consists of directors of the company; in Hungary and Poland,
directors can have an employment agreement with the company, which is not allowed in
Table 1. Corporate governance characteristics in East Central Europe
Bulgaria
Czech Republic
and Slovakia Poland Hungary Romania
What is called that
manages the firm









Board of Directors or
Management Board
Supervisory board mandatory in two-tier structure
Main task of supervisory
board
monitoring the company management or management board
Main tasks of
management board
and the Board of
Directors
managing the company, operative management, constitute firm strategy
Supervisory board size minimum 3 minimum 3
Czechia:
multiples of 3











and firm employees but















Source: compiled by the author.
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Bulgaria, Romania and in the Czech and Slovak Republics. Table 1 shows further characteristics
of corporate governance in East Central Europe.
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
3.1. Sample and descriptive statistics
The database includes data from 300 Bulgarian, Czech, Hungarian, Romanian, Polish and Slovakian
listed companies, excluding the strongly regulated financial and utility sectors. Financial data have
been downloaded from the Bloombergmonitor system, while information on corporate boards have
been collectedmanually from annual reports. Financial data are year-end data (December 31), while
the size of the board (number of directors) reflects the status as of January 1 in the given year. The
dataset covers the years between 2007 and 2016. Theoretically, there should be 3,000 firm-year
observations available for each variable, but as Table 2 shows, a number of observations are missing,
especially in earlier years. This means that the sample is an unbalanced panel dataset. Missing data
can impact the significance levels of the variables. The main cause of the missing observations is
unavailable data or the fact that the firm was not operational in a given year.
Descriptive statistics of the sample are presented in Table 3. The average management board
size is 3.83 and the median is 3, while the average supervisory board size is 5.57 and the median
is 5. Comparing these values with other studies, these board sizes are considered small on
average. In the sample, the standard deviation of the management board size is 1.886 and that of
the supervisory board size is 1.703. These variabilities can make regression results powerful. The
outside director ratio denotes the supervisory board size divided by the sum of supervisory
board size and management board size. This measure matches the ratio of outside or non-ex-
ecutive directors on the Board of Directors in the one-tiered corporate governance system.
The pairwise correlation among all the variables used in regression models are reported in
Table 4. Market performance measures such as Tobin’s Q and total shareholder return correlate
Table 2. Number of observations of board sizes and firm performance measures in each year
Year Management Board size Supervisory Board size Tobin’s Q and P/BV TSR ROA
2016 300 300 291 300 291
2015 300 300 295 300 297
2014 300 300 295 300 297
2013 297 297 285 291 294
2012 287 287 276 279 291
2011 281 281 268 255 288
2010 255 255 238 240 276
2009 233 233 223 231 259
2008 214 212 207 207 235
2007 203 200 183 182 217
Source: compiled by the author.
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negatively with management board size, but positively with outside director ratio. Operational
performance measures like ROA correlate in the opposite direction. Firm size correlates
moderately positively with management board size, but negatively with outside director ratio,
while firm size correlates negatively with all performance measures. CAPEX and cash variables
correlate positively with performance measures, but leverage correlates negatively and so do net
fixed assets and leverage variables.
Table 5 presents the statistical summary of the sample of my study. Of the 300 companies, more
than 70% are Polish. The average size of the management board is the largest in Hungary with 6
members and the lowest in Poland, with 3.13 members. There is no big difference with respect to
supervisory board size among the observed countries. Hungarian firms employ the most employees
and their revenues are the highest on average, while the average of firms’ market capitalization is
the highest in the Czech Republic. The average Tobin’s Q is the biggest among Polish companies
and the average total shareholder return the largest among Bulgarian firms, while the average ROA
is the biggest among Czech companies. Most companies are from the industrial sector, but the
largest companies are from the energy sector, all of them oil and gas companies.
Table 3. Descriptive statistics
Variables Obs Mean St. Dev. Min Max 25th percentile Median 75th percentile
Management Board size 2,668 3.834 1.886 1.000 13.000 3.000 3.000 5.000
Log Mgmt Board size 2,668 1.226 0.496 0.000 2.565 1.099 1.099 1.609
Supervisory Board size 2,663 5.573 1.703 1.000 15.000 5.000 5.000 6.000
Outside director ratio 2,660 0.603 0.113 0.250 0.889 5.000 0.625 7.000
Firm size 2,754 4.463 1.666 –4.871 9.702 3.389 4.351 5.397
Tobin’s Q 2,561 1.456 1.514 0.210 43.133 0.879 1.097 1.503
MB ratio 2,561 1.839 2.210 0.142 14.883 0.7108 1.178 1.982
TSR 2,585 0.194 1.524 –0.999 66.923 –0.213 0.045 0.369
ROA 2,748 0.041 0.138 –2.073 2.822 0.012 0.041 0.080
Age 2,561 9.233 5.464 1.000 23.000 4.000 9.000 14.000
Volatility 2,585 0.285 7.330 0.000 341.181 0.021 0.027 0.035
One-tiered management 2,665 0.143 0.350 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Minority 2,754 0.027 0.085 –0.790 1.401 0.000 0.000 0.020
Cash 2,754 0.085 0.103 0.000 0.992 0.019 0.048 0.113
Leverage 2,708 0.139 0.129 0.000 1.401 0.046 0.108 0.195
CAPEX 2,635 0.062 0.068 0.000 0.829 0.020 0.042 0.080
Net Fixed Assets 2,745 0.364 0.227 0.000 0.971 0.171 0.360 0.525
Source: author.
Notes: Management Board size denotes the number of directors on the management board. Log Mgmt Board size denotes the natural logarithm
of Management Board size. Supervisory Board size denotes the number of directors on the supervisory board. Outside director ratio denotes the
ratio between supervisory board size and the sum of management and supervisory board size. Firm size denotes the natural logarithm of total
assets. Tobin-Q is proxied by the market value of equity plus total liabilities plus preferred equities, scaled by total assets. TSR denotes total
shareholder return that equals the annual percentage change of share price plus dividend yield. ROA is Net Income scaled by Total Assets.
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3.2. Model specification
In the regression models, the dependent variables are the three most popular firm market
performance measures, and one firm operational performance measure used by other authors:
Tobin’s Q, market-to-book value ratio (MB ratio), total shareholder return (TSR) and ROA.
Tobin’s Q is used as a proxy for firm value and is calculated according to Chung and Pruitt
(1994); the MB ratio and TSR reflect the judgement of the market, while ROA expresses the
firm’s operational effectiveness. Tobin’s Q denotes the ratio of market value of equity plus
total debts plus minority interests plus preferred equities, scaled by total assets. The MB ratio
denotes the ratio of the market value of equity and book value of equity. TSR is the sum of the
annual yield of the share prices plus the dividend yield. Dividend yield is the ratio of the
dividend paid divided by the market value of equity in the previous year. ROA denotes the net
income scaled by total assets.
Table 4. Correlation between the main variables
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. Tobin’s Q 1.0000
2. MB ratio 0.8479* 1.0000
3. TSR 0.2580* 0.2125* 1.0000
4. ROA 0.2409* 0.1563* 0.1991* 1.0000
5. Log Boardsize –0.0623* –0.0228 –0.0364 0.0063 1.0000
6. Log Boardsize*Firmsize –0.1736* –0.1175* –0.0583* –0.0015 0.8263* 1.0000
7. Ouside director ratio 0.0493* 0.0233 0.0227 –0.0134 –0.7993* –0.5775* 1.0000
8. Log Boardsize*Outside director –0.0409* –0.0008 –0.0397* –0.0011 0.8870* 0.7552* –0.4909* 1.0000
9. Firmsize –0.2833* –0.2283* –0.0594* –0.0413* 0.4128* 0.8171* –0.1968* 0.4227*
10. Net Fixed Assets –0.0781* –0.0772* –0.0202 –0.0133 0.2317* 0.5232* –0.0419* 0.2830*
11. Leverage –0.1158* –0.0138 –0.0227 –0.1443* 0.0047 0.1056* 0.0189 0.0153
12. CAPEX 0.1059* 0.0970* –0.028 0.0807* 0.0115 –0.0061 0.0252 0.0463*
13. One tiered management –0.0833* –0.0821* 0.0226 –0.0335 0.3080* 0.0928* –0.3721* 0.1859*
14. Minority –0.1025* –0.1117* 0.0005 –0.0336 0.0538* 0.1275* –0.0787* –0.0032
15. Age –0.1727* –0.1164* 0.0018 –0.0227 0.1764* 0.2381* –0.1339* 0.1290*
16. Volatility –0.0104 –0.0126 0.0202 –0.0025 –0.0443* –0.0262 0.0365 –0.0454*
17. Cash lag1 0.3355* 0.2567* 0.0458* 0.2098* 0.008 –0.0775* –0.0203 –0.0051
18. Log Boardsize*Leverage –0.1064* –0.0119 –0.0339 –0.1215* 0.4103* 0.4409* –0.3118* 0.3711*
19. Log Boardsize*Cash lag1 0.2678* 0.2128* 0.0255 0.1900* 0.3144* 0.1821* –0.2742* 0.2563*
Source: author.
Notes: Pearson product moment correlations between main financial and corporate governance variables *denotes significance at 5% significance
level. MB ratio denotes market value of equity divided by book value of equity. Age is the number of years since the firm was first listed on the stock
exchange. Volatility is the annual volatility of the daily effective yield of share price. One-tier management is a dummy variable which’s value is one if
a firm uses a one-tier corporate governance system in each year. Minority denotes minority non-controlling interests divided by total shareholder
equity. Cash denotes cash and cash near items scaled by total assets. Leverage denotes total debts divided by total assets. CAPEX denotes capital
expenditures scaled by total assets. Net Fixed Assets denotes gross fixed assets minus accumulated depreciation scaled by total assets.
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Although some authors have warned against the using Tobin’s Q as a firm performance
measure (Bartlett – Partnoy 2018; Dybvig – Warachka 2010), Tobin’s Q is by far the most
popular market performance measure. The second most popular is the MB ratio and the third is
annual stock return, while the most popular accounting-based measurement is ROA, followed
by ROE (Al-Matari et al. 2014). Table 6 shows the pair-wise correlations between the perfor-
mance measures. Since ROA is considered the best operational measure (Hagel et al. 2013) and
the correlation between Tobin’s Q and ROA is the highest, in this sense, Tobin’s Q is still
considered the best market performance measure.
The paper adopts the techniques used by Yermack (1996) and Guest (2009). Yermack took
the natural logarithm of the board size and justified assuming a convex association between
board size and firm market value. In the regression models, the two main independent variables
are the natural logarithm of management board size and outside director ratio. The first plays a
role similar to the board of directors1 and the other to the outside director ratio in one-tiered
corporate governance studies. In the one-tiered corporate governance structure, the Board of
Directors consists of the executive directors who run the company and non-executive directors




–0.0776* 0.0895* 0.1603* 1.0000
–0.0896* –0.0648* –0.0591* 0.0164 1.0000
0.1636* 0.0849* 0.0167 –0.0681* –0.0497* 1.0000
0.2450* 0.0836* –0.0480* –0.1401* 0.0929* 0.0854* 1.0000
0.0089 –0.0069 0.0179 –0.0045 –0.0142 0.029 0.0440* 1.0000
–0.1724* –0.0623* –0.1881* 0.0427* –0.0422* –0.0168 –0.0641* –0.0161 1.0000
0.3326* 0.2625* 0.8460* 0.1303* 0.0539* 0.0385 0.011 –0.0089 –0.1562* 1.0000
–0.0122 –0.0092 –0.1714* 0.021 0.0298 0.0106 0.028 –0.0233 0.8828* –0.0455* 1.0000
1The board of directors consists of executive and non-executive or independent directors. Their proportion is called the
outside director ratio and it links to the board’s capability of monitoring firm management effectively.
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Table 5. Summary statistics
Obs MBoardsize SBoardsize Tobin’s Q TSR ROA Employee Market cap Revenues
Bulgaria 29 4.71 4.53 1.24 0.42 0.04 387 74.6 97.4
Czech Republic 8 4.80 5.47 1.27 0.11 0.06 2,018 913.7 809.3
Hungary 14 6.08 5.64 1.40 0.12 0.02 3,774 800.2 1,412.9
Poland 214 3.31 5.78 1.55 0.17 0.04 2,090 278.8 424.1
Romania 30 5.18 5.29 1.09 0.20 0.04 1,655 256.6 359.4
Slovakia 5 4.44 4.75 1.07 0.06 0.05 1,249 446.3 922.0
2007 203 3.90 5.57 2.02 0.42 0.07 1,773 582.1 426.7
2008 214 3.98 5.50 1.20 –0.56 0.05 1,940 247.7 504.8
2009 233 3.88 5.59 1.33 0.58 0.01 1,975 298.0 353.7
2010 255 3.87 5.66 1.45 0.24 0.05 2,022 336.4 413.9
2011 281 3.83 5.54 1.30 –0.19 0.05 1,998 248.1 477.5
2012 287 3.83 5.55 1.25 0.14 0.02 1,936 290.8 507.1
2013 297 3.76 5.64 1.48 0.54 0.04 1,907 285.8 483.1
2014 300 3.78 5.59 1.55 0.24 0.04 1,977 255.9 477.9
2015 300 3.78 5.54 1.52 0.21 0.05 1,969 272.1 458.5
2016 300 3.82 5.55 1.54 0.23 0.04 2,015 311.4 428.0
Basic Materials 24 3.81 5.81 1.31 0.20 0.03 3,183 485.9 485.9
Communications 18 4.06 6.48 1.59 0.23 0.05 2,895 841.0 841.0
Consumer Cyclical 52 3.41 5.26 1.38 0.19 0.04 1,384 154.8 154.8
Consumer Non-cyclical 59 4.16 5.49 1.73 0.16 0.04 1,435 202.2 202.2
Diversified 10 4.36 4.05 0.82 0.22 0.02 490 47.4 47.4
Energy 15 5.10 6.79 1.06 0.13 0.03 9,732 1932.2 1932.2
Industrial 99 3.54 5.61 1.31 0.20 0.04 1,142 92.4 92.4
Technology 23 4.04 5.28 2.25 0.25 0.08 1,205 131.9 131.9
Source: author.




















who are independent of the company. In this sense, it a reasonable assumption that the size of
the Board of Directors can have an impact on firm performance. In the two-tiered structure, the
management board (sometimes called the Board of Directors) consists of the executive directors.
Outside director ratio denotes the size of supervisory board divided by the sum of the size of
management and supervisory boards. Size refers to the number of directors.
As in all similar studies, control variables are used to isolate the effect of board size on firm
value. With these variables, the effects of potential firm characteristics effects can be controlled.
Leverage denotes long-term liabilities divided by total assets. According to empirical facts, larger
firms are older and have higher debts than younger and smaller firms. Nguyen et al. (2015)
mentioned the tax saving advantage of higher debts, while according to Jensen (1993), higher
debt can impose stricter discipline on management. A further control variable is net fixed assets
scaled by total assets. Nguyen et al. (2015: 7) claim that ‘higher fixed asset ratio implies higher
operating leverage. By using higher operating leverage firms may be able to leverage their un-
derlying profitability and thus increase their market value.’
Controlling for growth opportunities, a variable called CAPEX is used, which denotes capital
expenditure scaled by total assets. Nguyen et al. (2015: 7) argue that ‘higher levels of capital
expenditures or investments should produce higher cash flow in future years.’ A further control
variable being used is called one-tiered management, which equals one if corporate governance
structure is one-tiered at a firm in a given year. Another control variable is minority, which
denotes minority non-controlling interests divided by total shareholder equity. The last control
variable is cash, which denotes cash plus cash-near items scaled by total assets.
Besides these control variables, four interaction terms are used, similarly to Guest (2009).
Using interaction terms is based on Coles et al. (2008), who argue that the impact of board size on
performance will differ for different types of firms. The first interaction variable is management
board size multiplied by firm size. The second interaction variable is management board size
multiplied by the outside director ratio. The first and second interaction terms both indicate large
firms and the second term shows the effectiveness of the supervisory board. The third interaction
variable is management board size multiplied by leverage. This variable also indicates large
companies, and allows controlling for the leverage effect. Nguyen et al. (2015) mentioned that
highly levered firms require greater expertise to access external resources. On the other hand,
according to Guest (2009), for large, old and highly leveraged firms, a large board size may be an
optimal value maximising outcome. The last interaction term is management board size multiplied
by the first lag of the variable cash, which allows for controlling for the effect of large cash.
Table 6. Correlation matrix of the dependent variables
TSR Tobin’s Q MB ratio ROA ROE
TSR 1.0000
Tobin’s Q 0.2580* 1.0000
MB ratio 0.2125* 0.8479* 1.0000
ROA 0.1991* 0.2409* 0.1563* 1.0000
ROE 0.1223* 0.2165* 0.1787* 0.7278* 1.0000
Source: author.
Note: *denotes significance at the 5% level.
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The main econometric model is the following:
Firmperformance it ¼ constþ b1 LogMBoardsizeit þ b2$Outside director ratioit
þ bi$Control variablesit þ gi$Interaction variablesit þ ai þ dt þ «it (1)
ai: individual, firm or unobserved effects, time-invariant heterogeneity
dt: time dummies
«it: idiosyncratic error terms
In corporate governance studies, the most popular regression technique is the pooled OLS
model; but in this actual study, only two kinds of regression models are used: fixed effetcs panel-
regressions with year dummies, and GMM-type dynamic panel-regression. The pooling of data
(pooled OLS) means that in this regression model, each firm observation is treated as a separate
observation without considering that it may come from the same firm. One important OLS
model assumption cannot be met because the error terms are correlated across time. Using a
fixed effects panel-regression model, it is possible to control for the unobserved firm-specific
characteristics, because this regression modelling technique allows unobserved variables to be
correlated with the error term. So, the endogeneity problem, which is related to omitted vari-
ables, can be partially solved. F-test indicates whether the results of the firm fixed effects models
are correct and the joint significance of the fixed effects intercepts. The null hypothesis is that all
the fixed effects are zero. If the null hypothesis is rejected, then the fixed effects technique needs
to be used to get correct results.
Besides the fixed effects model, the GMM dynamic panel regression technique can help to solve
the endogeneity problem. As Guest (2009: 15) mentions: ‘a major econometric concern highlighted
by recent studies is that past and current firm performance determines board size. [. . .] fixed effects
analysis will be biased in the presence of such dynamic and simultaneous endogeneity.’ Guest
employed a GMM-type dynamic panel-regression technique. As Guest (2009: 17) explains, ‘this
approach allows board size (and other explanatory variables) to be determined by past and present
performance but not future performance, and therefore provides an appropriate econometric
specification for dealing with the endogeneity problems faced here.’
Stata version 13 has been used to run econometric models.
3.3. Hypotheses
To set up hypothesis, the mean and median values of Tobin’s Q, TSR and ROA have been
plotted against the size of the management board and supervisory board. This is represented in
Figs 1–3. Since the calculation of Tobin’s Q and MB ratio are very similar, only Tobin’s Q has
been illustrated. The figures present the same picture, as can be seen from the pairwise corre-
lation values. There is a negative relation between management board size and market per-
formance measures and a positive relation between management board size and operational
performance measures.
Based on the figures, the following hypotheses can be formulated:
 H1: There is a negative relationship between management board size and firm market per-
formance measures.
 H2: There is a positive relationship between management board size and firm operational
performance measures.
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Fig. 2. Mean and median values of TSR according to the size of management board
Fig. 1. Mean and median values of Tobin-Q according to the size of management board
Fig. 3. Mean and median values of ROA according to the size of management board
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Based on pairwise correlation, the following hypotheses can be expected:
 H3: There is a positive relationship between the outside director ratio and firm market
performance measures.
 H4: There is a negative relationship between the outside director ratio and firm operational
performance measures.
 H5:Usingboard sizemultiplied by thefirmsize interaction term,board size has apositive impact on
firm performance, but this interaction term has a negative impact on firm performance.
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
4.1. Fixed effects regression
Detailed regression results can be found in the Appendix of the paper. Table 7 shows the most
frequent signs of the significant variables in fixed effects regression models by firm performance
measures. Non-significant signs are in brackets. This means that if Tobin’s Q is used as a firm
performance measure, the variable Log Boardsize has a significant positive impact on firm
performance in most of the models, except in Model 2, where this effect is negative and not
significant. According to Table 7, there are only three variables which have the same impact on
firm performance in each of the firm performance measures: Log Boardsize, Log Board-
size*Firmsize and Log Boardsize*Cash lag1.
In fixed effects models, using Tobin’s Q, Market-to-book ratio, total shareholder return or
ROA as firm performance measure, management board size has a significant positive impact on
firm performance, while the interaction term between board size and firm size has a significant
negative impact on firm performance. This confirms Hypothesis H5 and the results of Guest
(2009). In the two-tiered corporate governance structure, the management board usually con-
sists of directors who are managing the company. They are experts in different fields, including
the CEO, the Chief Financial Officer, the Chief Operating Officer, the Chief Technology Officer,
or the Chief Human Resources Officer. So, it can be reasonably assumed that if more experts run
a firm, the firm can benefit from this.
These are consistent with the results of other researchers such as Jensen (1993; cited by
Nguyen et al. 2015: 5), who claimed that ‘when boards are relatively small, adding more di-
rectors can increase a firm’s value because the latter bring their expertise and relationships that
increase a firm’s competitiveness.’ The significant negative sign of the interaction term indicates
that for large firms, increasing board size has a negative impact on firm performance. This result
is the same as Guest’s. Operations of larger firms are more complex, involving more directors,
but it is not effective to increase the size of the management board.
The positive significant effect of the interaction term between board size and the first lag of
cash indicates the positive effect of bank monitoring and the disciplining impact of large excess
cash. In the case of TSR and ROA, this effect is also positive, but not significant.
According to the fixed effects regressions, the outside director ratio has a negative impact on
firm market performance and a positive impact on operative performance. This result does not
support the corporate governance assumption that an increase in the share of independent
members in corporate boards has a positive impact on firm performance. In the two-tiered
corporate governance structure, the supervisory board monitors the management board.
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Firm size has significant negative impact on firm performance except on ROA, and firm age
has a negative impact on firm performance. Furthermore, firm size, leverage and firm age have
significant negative impacts on firm performance, while CAPEX, which refers to investment
opportunities, has significant positive impact. Using the Market-to-book ratio as a firm per-
formance measure, the impacts are similar except for the effect of leverage. Using TSR as the
firm performance measure, the variables have fewer significant effects, but the three main in-
dependent variables have a similar impact on firm performance as in the case of the Tobin’s Q
and MB models. The main difference is that only the interaction term between board size and
firm size has a significant impact on firm performance.
4.2. Dynamic panel regression
Result from the dynamic panel regression models are similar to the fixed effects results: the
same three variables have the same impact on firm performance in each firm performance
measure.
In these models, the management board has a significant positive impact on firm market and
operational performance, while the interaction term between management board size and firm
size has a significant negative impact. The outside director ratio has a significant positive impact
on firm performance in case of Tobin’s Q and the Market-to-book ratio and positive in case of
total shareholder return and ROA. The effects of variables in the models with Tobin’s Q and MB
are the same. Firm size, CAPEX and one-tiered management have a significant positive impact
on firm performance, and so does firm age. The first lag of cash has a significant negative impact,
Table 7. Signs of independent variables
Tobin’s Q MB TSR ROA
Log Boardsize þ þ (þ) (þ)
Log Boardsize*Firmsize – – – –
Outside director ratio – – (–) (þ)
Log Boardsize*Outside director (–) (–) (þ) (–)
Firmsize – – – (þ)
Net Fixed Assets (–) (–) – –
Leverage – þ þ –
CAPEX þ þ (þ) þ
One-tiered_management (þ) (þ) (þ) –
Minority (–) (þ) (þ) þ
Age – – (–) –
Volatility (þ) (þ) (þ) (–)
LogBoardsize*Leverage (–) (–) (–) (þ)
Log Boardsize*Cash lag1 þ þ (þ) (þ)
Cash lag1 – – (–) (þ)
Source: author.
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while the management board size multiplied by firm size interaction term has a significant
positive impact on firm performance.
The negative sign of the first lag of TSR explains the phenomenon of the negative auto-
correlation of share returns (Table 8).
Comparing fixed effect models to dynamic panel regression models, it can be determined
that management board size has a significant positive impact on firm performance, but if this
variable is interacted with firm size, this effect is significantly negative. The impact of firm size
on firm performance is the same in fixed effect and in dynamic panel regression models. Firm
size has a significant negative impact on market performance, but positive impact on operational
performance. However, firm age has a different effect: according to the dynamic regression
models, it has a significant positive impact on market performance, the fixed effects models
show a negative effect.
Testing the hypotheses, H1 is not supported, but H2 is. Controlling individual firm char-
acteristics in firm fixed effects or in dynamic panel regression models, the impact of manage-
ment board size on firm market performance is the opposite as the pairwise correlations would
indicate. In the case of firm operational measures, this individual firm characteristic does not
matter. H3 is only supported in the dynamic regression models, but H4 is rejected. Moreover,
the outside director ratio has a positive impact on firm operational performance according to
both regression techniques. H5 is supported by both regression techniques.
Table 8. Signs of the independent variables
Tobin’s Q MB TSR ROA
Lag 1 of dependent variables þ þ – þ
Log Boardsize þ þ þ þ
Log Boardsize*Firmsize – – – –
Outside director ratio þ þ (þ) (þ)
Log Boardsize*Outside director (–) (–) (–) (þ)
Firmsize – – – þ
Net Fixed Assets (–) (–) (þ) –
Leverage (–) (–) þ –
CAPEX – – – þ
One-tiered_management – – (þ) –
Minority (–) (–) (–) þ
Age þ þ þ (–)
Volatility (–) (–) (þ) (þ)
LogBoardsize*Leverage (–) (–) þ þ
Log Boardsize*Cash lag1 þ þ (þ) (þ)
Cash lag1 – – (–) (–)
Source: author.
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5. CONCLUSIONS
The paper has analysed the relationship between corporate governance characteristics and firm
performance measures. In two-tiered corporate governance systems, there are two boards, the
management board, consisting of the directors or top managers of the company, and the su-
pervisory board, comprising individuals independent from the company. The management board
is responsible for operating activities and strategic decision-making, and the supervisory board for
monitoring the management board. Therefore, it can be a credible assumption that the sizes of
these boards can have an impact on firm performance. Based on the results, the management
board has a significant positive impact on both market and operational performance measures, but
this effect is limited, which is shown by the significant negative sign of the interaction term be-
tween board size and firm size. Firm performance cannot be improved if management board size
increases along with firm size. The outside director ratio also has a positive impact on a firm’s
performance measures in dynamic regression models and this effect is significant for Tobin’s Q
and the market-to-book value ratio. The interaction term between management board size and
cash have the same effect on firm performance as the outside director ratio. These results indicate
that larger cash can have a disciplining effect on the management board.
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APPENDIX
Table 9. Fixed effects panel regression models, dependent variable: Tobin’s Q
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)























Ouside director ratio –0.716** –0.663** –0.292 –0.622* –0.533





Firmsize –0.248*** –0.249*** –0.143*** –0.135*** –0.162*** –0.127**
(0.0355) (0.0355) (0.0500) (0.0506) (0.0515) (0.0517)
Net Fixed
Assets
–0.248* –0.202 –0.190 –0.185 –0.191 –0.0237
(0.149) (0.150) (0.149) (0.149) (0.149) (0.155)
Leverage –0.504*** –0.511*** –0.534*** –0.533*** –0.0346 –0.501***
(0.154) (0.154) (0.153) (0.153) (0.350) (0.153)
CAPEX 1.164*** 1.163*** 1.159*** 1.158*** 1.162*** 0.748***
(0.261) (0.260) (0.260) (0.260) (0.260) (0.271)
One tiered management 0.216 0.225 0.207 0.182 0.214 0.205
(0.178) (0.177) (0.177) (0.179) (0.177) (0.177)
Minority –0.233 –0.234 –0.214 –0.221 –0.203 –0.295
(0.209) (0.208) (0.208) (0.208) (0.208) (0.202)
Age –0.0581*** –0.0572*** –0.0569*** –0.0567*** –0.0568*** 0.0335***






















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Volatility 0.000192 0.000196 0.000114 0.000185 0.000134 –0.000189
(0.00155) (0.00155) (0.00155) (0.00155) (0.00154) (0.00149)
Log Boardsize*Leverage –0.405
(0.255)




Constant 3.315*** 3.874*** 3.357*** 3.047*** 3.334*** 1.957***
(0.176) (0.328) (0.369) (0.492) (0.369) (0.384)
Observations 2,281 2,278 2,278 2,278 2,278 2,118
R-squared 0.179 0.180 0.184 0.184 0.185 0.093
Number of IndexF-test 29718.53 29718.63 29718.48 29718.46 29718.50 29518.04




















Table 10. GMM-type dynamic panel regression models, dependent variable: Tobin’s Q
Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Lag1Tobin’s Q 0.235*** 0.235*** 0.235*** 0.234*** 0.234*** 0.233***
(0.0207) (0.0207) (0.0207) (0.0207) (0.0208) (0.0208)
Log Boardsize –0.0114 0.157 0.645*** 0.919** 0.650*** 0.521**
(0.0635) (0.106) (0.224) (0.436) (0.225) (0.227)
Log Boardsize*Firmsize –0.105** –0.117** –0.101** –0.103**
(0.0423) (0.0455) (0.0430) (0.0422)
Ouside director ratio 0.868** 0.895** 1.300* 0.906** 0.903**
(0.438) (0.438) (0.703) (0.439) (0.438)
Log Boardsize*Outside director –0.297
(0.404)
Firmsize –0.618*** –0.617*** –0.491*** –0.479*** –0.496*** –0.491***
(0.0408) (0.0409) (0.0650) (0.0671) (0.0661) (0.0654)
Net Fixed Assets –0.0311 –0.0255 –0.0180 –0.0203 –0.0241 –0.0565
(0.211) (0.211) (0.211) (0.211) (0.211) (0.211)
Leverage –0.159 –0.171 –0.184 –0.182 –0.0346 –0.193
(0.195) (0.195) (0.195) (0.195) (0.443) (0.195)
CAPEX –0.824** –0.814** –0.813** –0.813** –0.808** –0.793**
(0.325) (0.325) (0.325) (0.325) (0.325) (0.330)
One tiered management –0.607*** –0.593*** –0.614*** –0.647*** –0.613*** –0.566***
(0.199) (0.199) (0.199) (0.204) (0.199) (0.199)
Minority –0.112 –0.110 –0.0923 –0.0978 –0.0897 –0.0974
(0.255) (0.255) (0.255) (0.255) (0.255) (0.256)
Age 0.0387*** 0.0388*** 0.0390*** 0.0392*** 0.0390*** 0.0379***























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Volatility –0.000340 –0.000378 –0.000403 –0.000372 –0.000381 –0.000446
(0.00153) (0.00153) (0.00153) (0.00153) (0.00153) (0.00153)
Log Boardsize*Leverage –0.126
(0.336)




Constant 3.694*** 2.949*** 2.380*** 2.026*** 2.375*** 2.512***
(0.197) (0.425) (0.485) (0.684) (0.485) (0.487)
Observations 2,098 2,098 2,098 2,098 2,098 2,098
Number of Index 294 294 294 294 294 294




















Table 11. Fixed effects panel regression models, dependent variable: Market-to-Book ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Log Boardsize 0.303*** 0.0364 0.728* 0.845 0.768** 0.331
(0.113) (0.184) (0.383) (0.720) (0.385) (0.423)
Log Boardsize*Firmsize –0.144** –0.148** –0.131* –0.112
(0.0701) (0.0727) (0.0715) (0.0744)
Outside director ratio –1.434* –1.355* –1.172 –1.299 –1.354
(0.814) (0.814) (1.254) (0.816) (0.852)
Log Boardsize*Outside director –0.136
(0.711)
Firmsize –0.764*** –0.759*** –0.581*** –0.578*** –0.608*** –0.602***
(0.0871) (0.0870) (0.122) (0.124) (0.126) (0.129)
Net Fixed Assets –0.209 –0.159 –0.149 –0.147 –0.145 0.200
(0.361) (0.362) (0.361) (0.362) (0.361) (0.386)
Leverage 1.119*** 1.126*** 1.088*** 1.089*** 1.780** 1.099***
(0.383) (0.382) (0.382) (0.382) (0.846) (0.396)
CAPEX 1.932*** 1.915*** 1.908*** 1.907*** 1.914*** 1.220*
(0.634) (0.633) (0.632) (0.632) (0.632) (0.681)
One-tiered_management 0.416 0.460 0.432 0.418 0.442 0.533
(0.431) (0.430) (0.430) (0.436) (0.430) (0.439)
Minority 0.0403 0.00732 –0.000137 –0.000710 0.0200 0.0271
(0.599) (0.597) (0.597) (0.597) (0.597) (0.607)
Age –0.0844*** –0.0817*** –0.0810*** –0.0809*** –0.0809*** 0.0930***
(0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0154)
Volatility 0.000233 0.000227 8.46e05 0.000119 0.000114 –0.000311






















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
LogBoardsize*Leverage –0.573
(0.625)




Constant 6.101*** 7.214*** 6.361*** 6.208*** 6.321*** 4.257***
(0.430) (0.793) (0.894) (1.198) (0.895) (0.958)
Observations 2,260 2,257 2,257 2,257 2,257 2,098
R-squared 0.129 0.127 0.129 0.129 0.129 0.075
Number of IndexF-test 296 296 296 296 296 294




















Table 12. GMM-type dynamic panel regression models, dependent variable: Market-to-Book ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Lag 1 MB 0.235*** 0.235*** 0.235*** 0.234*** 0.234*** 0.233***
(0.0207) (0.0207) (0.0207) (0.0207) (0.0208) (0.0208)
Log Boardsize –0.0114 0.157 0.645*** 0.919** 0.650*** 0.521**
(0.0635) (0.106) (0.224) (0.436) (0.225) (0.227)
Log Boardsize*Firmsize –0.105** –0.117** –0.101** –0.103**
(0.0423) (0.0455) (0.0430) (0.0422)
Ouside director ratio 0.868** 0.895** 1.300* 0.906** 0.903**
(0.438) (0.438) (0.703) (0.439) (0.438)
Log Boardsize*Outside director –0.297
(0.404)
Firmsize –0.618*** –0.617*** –0.491*** –0.479*** –0.496*** –0.491***
(0.0408) (0.0409) (0.0650) (0.0671) (0.0661) (0.0654)
Net Fixed Assets –0.0311 –0.0255 –0.0180 –0.0203 –0.0241 –0.0565
(0.211) (0.211) (0.211) (0.211) (0.211) (0.211)
Leverage –0.159 –0.171 –0.184 –0.182 –0.0346 –0.193
(0.195) (0.195) (0.195) (0.195) (0.443) (0.195)
CAPEX –0.824** –0.814** –0.813** –0.813** –0.808** –0.793**
(0.325) (0.325) (0.325) (0.325) (0.325) (0.330)
One tiered management –0.607*** –0.593*** –0.614*** –0.647*** –0.613*** –0.566***
(0.199) (0.199) (0.199) (0.204) (0.199) (0.199)
Minority –0.112 –0.110 –0.0923 –0.0978 –0.0897 –0.0974
(0.255) (0.255) (0.255) (0.255) (0.255) (0.256)
Age 0.0387*** 0.0388*** 0.0390*** 0.0392*** 0.0390*** 0.0379***






















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Volatility –0.000340 –0.000378 –0.000403 –0.000372 –0.000381 –0.000446
(0.00153) (0.00153) (0.00153) (0.00153) (0.00153) (0.00153)
Log Boardsize*Leverage –0.126
(0.336)




Constant 3.694*** 2.949*** 2.380*** 2.026*** 2.375*** 2.512***
(0.197) (0.425) (0.485) (0.684) (0.485) (0.487)
Observations 2,098 2,098 2,098 2,098 2,098 2,098
Number of Index 294 294 294 294 294 294




















Table 13. Fixed effects panel regression models, dependent variable: TSR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Log Boardsize –0.0582 –0.151* 0.170 0.0340 0.175 0.187
(0.0514) (0.0840) (0.174) (0.327) (0.175) (0.192)
Log Boardsize*Firmsize –0.0670** –0.0627* –0.0652** –0.0713**
(0.0318) (0.0331) (0.0325) (0.0339)
Outside director ratio –0.502 –0.460 –0.670 –0.452 –0.183
(0.373) (0.373) (0.569) (0.374) (0.393)
Log Boardsize*Outside director 0.159
(0.324)
Firmsize –0.175*** –0.177*** –0.0964* –0.101* –0.100* –0.0662
(0.0387) (0.0388) (0.0545) (0.0553) (0.0563) (0.0582)
Net Fixed Assets –0.756*** –0.736*** –0.726*** –0.728*** –0.726*** –0.624***
(0.164) (0.165) (0.165) (0.165) (0.165) (0.178)
Leverage 0.456*** 0.455*** 0.435** 0.434** 0.536 0.373**
(0.169) (0.169) (0.169) (0.169) (0.387) (0.176)
CAPEX 0.237 0.226 0.224 0.225 0.225 0.458
(0.288) (0.289) (0.288) (0.288) (0.288) (0.312)
One-tiered_management 0.129 0.139 0.129 0.144 0.130 0.158
(0.193) (0.193) (0.193) (0.196) (0.193) (0.198)
Minority 0.00185 0.00569 0.0224 0.0265 0.0245 –0.0162
(0.232) (0.232) (0.232) (0.232) (0.232) (0.234)
Age –0.00332 –0.00288 –0.00255 –0.00262 –0.00253 0.0980***
(0.00665) (0.00666) (0.00666) (0.00666) (0.00666) (0.00709)
Volatility 0.000451 0.000458 0.000396 0.000356 0.000400 0.000197






















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Log Boardsize*Leverage –0.0815
(0.281)
Log Boardsize*Cash lag1 0.457 (0.405)
Cash lag1 –0.576 (0.545)
Constant 1.332*** 1.751*** 1.357*** 1.534*** 1.353*** –0.312
(0.193) (0.363) (0.408) (0.545) (0.408) (0.439)
Observations 2,300 2,297 2,297 2,297 2,297 2,133
R-squared 0.257 0.258 0.259 0.259 0.259 0.274
Number of IndexF-test 29718.53 29718.63 29718.48 29718.46 29718.50 29518.04




















Table 14. GMM-type dynamic panel regression models, dependent variable: TSR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Lag1TSR –0.0700*** –0.0706*** –0.0736*** –0.0739*** –0.0716*** –0.0717***
(0.0194) (0.0194) (0.0194) (0.0194) (0.0195) (0.0195)
Log Boardsize –0.0744 –0.0257 1.092*** 1.496** 1.027*** 1.039***
(0.0930) (0.154) (0.319) (0.651) (0.321) (0.329)
Log Boardsize*Firmsize –0.238*** –0.256*** –0.252*** –0.228***
(0.0595) (0.0651) (0.0604) (0.0603)
Ouside director ratio 0.261 0.328 0.929 0.232 0.450
(0.653) (0.652) (1.056) (0.655) (0.659)
Log Boardsize*Outside director –0.434
(0.599)
Firmsize –0.0744 –0.0760 0.203** 0.223** 0.224** 0.188**
(0.0542) (0.0543) (0.0887) (0.0937) (0.0899) (0.0904)
Net Fixed Assets 0.183 0.178 0.247 0.242 0.243 0.218
(0.286) (0.286) (0.286) (0.286) (0.286) (0.290)
Leverage 0.543* 0.542* 0.506* 0.509* –0.423 0.495*
(0.281) (0.281) (0.281) (0.281) (0.629) (0.283)
CAPEX –1.878*** –1.878*** –1.873*** –1.865*** –1.842*** –1.887***
(0.477) (0.477) (0.476) (0.476) (0.477) (0.490)
One tiered management 0.191 0.205 0.133 0.0656 0.113 0.208
(0.275) (0.275) (0.275) (0.287) (0.275) (0.280)
Minority –0.189 –0.195 –0.158 –0.166 –0.184 –0.156
(0.371) (0.371) (0.370) (0.370) (0.371) (0.376)
Age 0.0106 0.0106 0.0134* 0.0138* 0.0137* 0.0115






















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Volatility 0.00115 0.00112 0.000987 0.00108 0.000984 0.000972
(0.00222) (0.00222) (0.00222) (0.00222) (0.00222) (0.00222)
Log Boardsize*Leverage 0.771*
(0.466)




Constant 0.424* 0.214 –1.102* –1.641 –0.979 –1.053
(0.236) (0.576) (0.667) (1.008) (0.671) (0.683)
Observations 2,069 2,069 2,069 2,069 2,069 2,048
Number of Index 297 297 297 297 297 295




















Table 15. Fixed effects panel regression models, dependent variable: ROA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Log Boardsize –0.00204 0.000386 0.0369 0.0472 0.0333 0.0387
(0.00681) (0.0111) (0.0231) (0.0434) (0.0232) (0.0260)
Log Boardsize*Firmsize –0.00763* –0.00796* –0.00889** –0.00631
(0.00422) (0.00439) (0.00431) (0.00458)
Outside director ratio 0.00920 0.0139 0.0299 0.00888 0.0485
(0.0495) (0.0496) (0.0756) (0.0497) (0.0530)
Log Boardsize*Outside director –0.0121
(0.0431)
Firmsize 0.000868 0.000937 0.0101 0.0105 0.0129* 0.00279
(0.00513) (0.00514) (0.00724) (0.00734) (0.00747) (0.00785)
Net Fixed Assets –0.210*** –0.209*** –0.208*** –0.208*** –0.208*** –0.217***
(0.0218) (0.0219) (0.0219) (0.0219) (0.0219) (0.0240)
Leverage –0.0365 –0.0375* –0.0397* –0.0396* –0.107** –0.0194
(0.0224) (0.0225) (0.0225) (0.0225) (0.0513) (0.0237)
CAPEX 0.176*** 0.177*** 0.177*** 0.177*** 0.176*** 0.167***
(0.0382) (0.0383) (0.0383) (0.0383) (0.0383) (0.0421)
One-tiered_management –0.0785*** –0.0790*** –0.0801*** –0.0813*** –0.0808*** –0.0557**
(0.0256) (0.0257) (0.0256) (0.0260) (0.0256) (0.0267)
Minority 0.0560* 0.0557* 0.0576* 0.0573* 0.0562* 0.0567*
(0.0308) (0.0308) (0.0308) (0.0308) (0.0308) (0.0316)
Age –0.00256*** –0.00253*** –0.00249*** –0.00248*** –0.00250*** 0.000476
(0.000882) (0.000884) (0.000884) (0.000884) (0.000884) (0.000957)
Volatility –8.74e06 –8.89e06 –1.59e05 –1.29e05 –1.87e05 –1.63e05






















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
LogBoardsize*Leverage 0.0542
(0.0373)




Constant 0.149*** 0.140*** 0.0949* 0.0815 0.0974* 0.0505
(0.0255) (0.0482) (0.0542) (0.0724) (0.0542) (0.0593)
Observations 2,299 2,296 2,296 2,296 2,296 2,132
R-squared 0.075 0.075 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.074
Number of IndexF-test 2974.38 2974.36 2974.36 2974.36 2974.37 2954.30




















Table 16. GMM-type dynamic panel regression models, dependent variable: ROA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Lag1ROA 0.274*** 0.273*** 0.274*** 0.277*** 0.280*** 0.269***
(0.0244) (0.0244) (0.0243) (0.0247) (0.0246) (0.0247)
Log Boardsize 0.0301*** 0.0506*** 0.144*** 0.0908 0.134*** 0.137***
(0.0108) (0.0181) (0.0375) (0.0745) (0.0376) (0.0380)
Log Boardsize*Firmsize –0.0201*** –0.0175** –0.0220*** –0.0200***
(0.00703) (0.00756) (0.00714) (0.00701)
Ouside director ratio 0.111 0.120 0.0419 0.110 0.119
(0.0781) (0.0781) (0.124) (0.0782) (0.0781)
Log Boardsize*Outside director 0.0571
(0.0703)
Firmsize 0.0107 0.0104 0.0345*** 0.0316*** 0.0395*** 0.0337***
(0.00810) (0.00811) (0.0117) (0.0121) (0.0121) (0.0117)
Net Fixed Assets –0.200*** –0.202*** –0.200*** –0.198*** –0.203*** –0.202***
(0.0361) (0.0361) (0.0361) (0.0362) (0.0360) (0.0363)
Leverage –0.0750** –0.0746** –0.0794** –0.0794** –0.231*** –0.0774**
(0.0330) (0.0330) (0.0330) (0.0330) (0.0768) (0.0330)
CAPEX 0.146*** 0.147*** 0.146*** 0.147*** 0.153*** 0.150***
(0.0543) (0.0543) (0.0543) (0.0543) (0.0542) (0.0551)
One tiered management –0.0735* –0.0775* –0.0735* –0.0707* –0.0776* –0.0749*
(0.0415) (0.0417) (0.0417) (0.0421) (0.0417) (0.0416)
Minority 0.0961** 0.0949** 0.0999** 0.101** 0.0945** 0.100**
(0.0451) (0.0451) (0.0451) (0.0451) (0.0451) (0.0450)
Age –2.03e05 3.64e05 2.28e05 2.50e05 –6.82e05 –2.46e05






















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Volatility 9.53e05 8.78e05 8.36e05 8.82e05 9.32e05 8.07e05
(0.000267) (0.000267) (0.000267) (0.000267) (0.000266) (0.000266)
Log Boardsize*Leverage 0.125**
(0.0569)




Constant 0.0191 –0.0713 –0.184** –0.114 –0.174** –0.171**
(0.0356) (0.0727) (0.0833) (0.118) (0.0833) (0.0840)
Observations 2,130 2,128 2,128 2,128 2,128 2,128
Number of Index 295 295 295 295 295 295
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